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Abstract
In this paper, we generalize the notion of a communication equilibrium (Forges 1986, Myerson
1986) of a game with incomplete information by introducing two new types of correlation device,
namely extended and Bayesian devices. These new devices explicitly model the ‘thinking process’ of
the device, i.e. the manner in which it generates outputs conditional on inputs. We proceed to endow
these devices with both information processing errors, in the form of non-partitional information,
and multiple transition and prior distributions, and prove that these two properties are equivalent
in this context, thereby generalizing the result of Brandenburger, Dekel and Geanakoplos (1988).
We proceed to discuss the Revelation Principle for each device, and conclude by nesting a certain
class of ‘cheap-talk’ equilibria of the underlying game within Bayesian communication equilibria.
These so-called fallible talk equilibria cannot be generated by standard communication equilibria.
∗I am greatly indebted to Francoise Forges and Indra Ray for their numerous suggestions, Sushama Murty for her
initial guidance, Peter Hammond for invaluable discussions, and especially my supervisor Herakles Polemarchakis, for his
patience, good humour and generosity. Naturally, all errors and omissions are the author’s sole responsibility.
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1 Introduction
Much has been written on the topics of the Common Prior assumption, non-partitional information
and communication equilibria. To the author’s best knowledge, nothing has been written on the
intersection of all three areas. This is the broad objective of the present paper.
It is well known that if players are fully rational and share a common prior on the uncertain states of
the world, then there is no incentive in equilibrium to bet whilst trading (see [Milgrom, Stokey, 1982]).
The inverse is often observed in reality; people who share different probability assessments regarding
an event often bet against each other, thus expanding the set of equilibrium payoffs available. This
behaviour is rational, in the sense that betting can form part of a Nash equilibrium. However, there are
arguments against admitting so-called ‘heterogenous priors’; see [Harsanyi, 1967] and [Aumann, 1987].
It is also well known that information processing that admits bounded rationality generates similar
phenomena (see [Geanakoplos, 1989]). The paper of Brandenburger, Dekel and Geanakoplos (1989)
represents a concise attempt to link heterogenous priors and bounded rationality, within the context
of correlated equilibria. In this paper, we offer a natural extension of their work to communication
equilibria. It is easy to think of situations in which communication devices, which essentially act
as a third-party arbitrators between players in Bayesian games, could exhibit some form of bounded
rationality or imperfection. Take a market mechanism in a production economy under uncertainty,
which receives information regarding players’ endowments and preferences, and issues advice regarding
prices. It is certainly conceivable that such a mechanism could operate under information processing
imperfections. However, in order to study such situations, we must first explicitly model the manner
in which the device interprets information, i.e. its ‘thinking process’. In this paper, we construct two
new types of communication device that allow us to do precisely this.
We begin by giving a brief overview of the existing work on inconsistent beliefs and non-partitional
information, communication equilibria, canonical equilibria and the Revelation Principle and cheap talk
extensions. Chapter 2 introduces the concept of an extended communication device, or simply extended
devices. Such devices consist of an input space, and output space and a transition probability from a
subset of the power set of the input space to the output space. We provide examples that demonstrate
how such devices offer Pareto-improving outcomes to standard devices, through a process akin to
‘betting’. We then introduce the notion of decision-theoretic equivalence, and show that the set of
generalized extended communication equilibria is equal to the set of subjective extended communication
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equilibria, via this equivalence relation. Chapter 3 introduces the notion of a Bayesian communication
device, or simply Bayesian devices. We show that extended devices are essentially a reduced form
version of Bayesian devices. We redefine the notion of decision-theoretic equivalence so that it retains
tractability in this new setting, and prove that the set of generalized Bayesian devices is equal to the
set of subjective Bayesian devices. Chapter 4 discusses briefly the problem of classifying the set of
canonical extended and Bayesian equilibria, or equivalently proving a revelation principle in this case.
We show how the problem is trivial for subjective Bayesian devices, but that the problem is more
complex for generalized Bayesian devices. Chapter 5 discusses how Bayesian communication equilibria
nest a certain class of cheap talk equilibria of the game, in which players can communicate directly,
but such communication is prone to error. As such, this process is termed fallible talk. We conclude
by discussing possible further extensions.
2 Background
2.1 Inconsistent Beliefs and Non-Partitional Information
Consider the following situation. A decision-maker is faced with uncertainty, represented by a state-
space Ω. He already possesses beliefs about these uncertain states, represented by a prior probability
distribution pi over Ω. When a state is realized, he can perceive it up to some level of accuracy. This
is represented by his information function:
P : Ω −→ 2Ω,
where 2Ω is the power set of Ω. Each element of the image space P(Ω) referred to as information sets,
and we say that he ‘knows P(ω) at ω’.
Having ascertained the information set the true state lies in, he now updates his prior distribution to
form his posterior distribution, accounting for this new information by a process of Bayesian updating :
p¯i(ω′|P(ω)) =

pi(ω′)∑
ωˆ∈P(ω) pi(ωˆ)
if ω′ ∈ P(ω)
0 ω′ /∈ P(ω)
For example, suppose Ω = {1, 2, 3}, pi(1) = pi(2) = pi(3) = 13 , and P(1) = P(2) = {1, 2},P(3) = {3}.
Now suppose the true state is 1. Then the posteriors become p¯i(1) = 12 , p¯i(2) =
1
2 , p¯i(3) = 0.
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This example uses a special form of information function, in that the image under P forms a partition
of Ω. In this case, we say that the information function induces an information partition of Ω; more
specifically, if
1. Non-Delusion ω ∈ P(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω
2. ω′ ∈ P(ω)⇒ P(ω′) = P(ω)
Within the context of Bayesian games, such information structures are generally assumed. Indeed, the
‘type-space’ representation of uncertainty implicitly assumes partitional information. The standard
form of a Bayesian game assumes a state space Ω, a type space Ti for each i, and a surjective signal
function τi : Ω → Ti (see [Osborne, Rubinstein, 1994]). Then if τi(ω) = ti, we have that Pi(w) =
τ−1i (ti), where Pi is player i’s information function. That τi is a function implies that Pi is partitional,
in particular, the partition Pi is generated by the equivalence relation
ω ∼i ω′ ⇔ τi(ω) = τi(ω′)
If the information function does not necessarily induce a partition, we call it a possibility correspon-
dence (see [Geanakoplos, 1989]). It can be shown that such structures embody a departure from full
rationality, or at the very least, error-free information processing. In a possibility correspondence, the
existence of ‘overlaps’ implies that agents do not necessarily ‘know what they know’, i.e. it may not
be the case that ω′ ∈ P(w)⇒ P(ω′) ⊂ P(ω). There are many forms of such ‘bounded rationality’ that
have been studied extensively. See for example [Geanakoplos, 1989], [Samet, 1990] and [Shin, 1993].
It is clear how the scenario above can be extended to an arbitrary n-person set-up. In this case,
the assumption that the prior distribution is identical for all players is precisely the Common Prior
assumption (CPA), or Harsanyi doctrine.1 Much has been written on the role of the CPA in Bayesian
games.2 Indeed, that posterior distributions are allowed to differ on account of diverging information
represents faithfully Harsanyi’s (1967) original rationale, which argues that differences in player’s beliefs
should stem purely from differences in information, i.e. that “...there is no rational basis for people
who have always been fed precisely the same information to maintain different subjective probabilities”
([Aumann, 1976]). As such, subjective priors could be explained by errors in information processing.
This is one of the central propositions of the present paper. There are however several defenses of
1Departure from the CPA is variously referred to as subjective/different/heterogenous/inconsistent priors/beliefs.
2See [Aumann, 1987].
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inconsistent beliefs. See, for example, [Morris, 1995]. Morris cites various examples where learning
opportunities may be limited, thus resulting in different priors. Indeed, such an observation implicitly
assumes that the formation of the prior is far from arbitrary, and moreover that a common prior assumes
boundless opportunities to learn prior to the commencement of the game. The present question is: how
can inconsistent beliefs be justified within the context of games with communication? Far from being
an advocation of heterogenous priors, this paper suggests that heterogenous priors can be explained
via bounded rationality, specifically non-partitional information structures.
Brandenburger, and Dekel and Geanakoplos 1988 - henceforth BDG - show that in the context of
correlated equilibrium (defined below), heterogenous priors and non-partitional information essentially
amount to the same thing. We will discuss this result at length below.
2.2 Correlated and Communication Equilibria
The concept of a correlated equilibrium was proposed in [Aumann, 1967] for normal-form games. It
poses both the first credible alternative to (mixed) Nash equilibrium and the first real attempt at incor-
porating communication into a game theoretic solution concept. Essentially, the idea behind correlated
equilibrium is to introduce a layer of uncertainty into the solution in order to help correlate players’
strategies. Take the familiar example of a crossroads: two cars approach a crossroads at right-angles.
Their pure strategies are ‘stop’ and ‘go’. Clearly, for some natural choice of payoffs, there exist Nash
equilibria that impose inegalitarian delays, or may even result in an accident. However, installation
of a traffic light, with two states corresponding to ‘stop’ and ‘go’, can clearly help correlate player’s
actions to achieve a pareto-superior outcome to any Nash equilibrium.3 This example demonstrates
how the uncertainty in a correlated equilibrium can be represented by a ‘device’ - in this case, a traffic
light - which generates outputs that the players use to make their choices. With this in mind, we
present a formal definition of correlated equilibrium, based on [Forges, 2009].
Definition 1. A correlation device is a tuple d = (Ω, (Pi)i∈N , pi), where Ω is the state space, Pi is
player i’s partitional information function and pi is the prior measure over Ω.
Now let Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be a game. Let d = (Ω, (Pi)i∈N , pi) be a correlation device. Then a
correlated equilibrium of Γ is a tuple (d, (fi)i∈N ), where d is a correlation device, and f is a Nash
equilibrium of the game Γd, constructed by adding the device d to Γ.
3This is an example of a canonical correlated equilibrium, which will be discussed at length later.
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Γd is played as follows: First, the state of nature is realized. Second, each player is informed of
their private information, using the Pi’s. Third, the player’s make their moves, conditional on this
information.
Specifically, the equilibrium conditions are:
∑
ω′∈Pi(ω)
pi(ω′|Pi(ω))ui(f(ω)) >
∑
ω′∈Pi(ω)
pi(ω′|Pi(ω))ui(ai, f−i(ω)), ∀i ∈ N, ∀ω ∈ Ω : pi(ω) > 0, ∀ai ∈ Ai
The notion of a communication equilibrium was introduced in [Myerson, 1982], later formalized in
[Myerson, 1986] and generalized in [Forges, 1986], as an extension of correlated equilibrium to Bayesian
games. Correlated equilibrium involves unidirectional communication. This may entail a loss of effi-
ciency in the incomplete information case, where players now have private information that could be
put to use by the device in generating its output. Recall the example of the traffic light. Assume now
that each car could be approaching at two speeds, ‘fast’ and ‘slow’, could be either ‘far’ or ‘near’ to
the cross-roads, and that the other car is uncertain about these parameters. If the traffic light could
collect information regarding each car’s speed and distance from the cross-roads, it could generate
pareto-superior outcomes than without such capabilities.
Thus, if we extend the correlation device to allow bi-directional communication, i.e. to and from the
players, we can successfully utilize the information contained in players’ types to broaden the set of
equilibrium payoffs. This is essentially the intuition behind communication equilibria. We formalize
this in the following definition:4
Definition 2. An communication device is a tuple
dc = ((Si)i∈N , (Mi)i∈N , (pi)) ,
where Si is the set of inputs from i to the device, Mi is the set of private outputs from the device to i,
pi is the transition probability the device uses to generate output vectors given input vectors, and P id is
the device’s possibility correspondence on S =
∏
i∈N Si for each i.
4This definition follows Forges (1986). Later, we will show how Myerson’s definition is nested in Forges’
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Now let ΓB = (N, (Ti)i∈N , p, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be a Bayesian game. Let
dc = ((Si)i∈N , (Mi)i∈N , (pi))
be a communication device. The game ΓdB formed by attaching the device dc to ΓB is played as follows:
first, the players’ types are realized according to p. Next, the players choose an input si ∈ Si to
communicate to the device5. The device then generates a private output mi ∈ Mi according to the
transition measure pi for each player, conditional on having received the input vector s =
∏
i∈N si.
Finally, each player chooses an action in Ai, conditional on their type, their chosen input and the
device’s private output. Hence, a strategy for player i is a pair (σi, δi), where
σi : Ti −→ Si
δi : Si ×Mi × Ti −→ ∆Ai
In other words, σi chooses player i’s input, given their type, and δi chooses player i’s action in Γ, given
their input, private output and type. A strategy profile is defined in the usual way over the product
spaces.
An communication equilibrium (CE) of ΓB is a Nash equilibrium of the game ΓdB, for a given dc.
2.3 Canonical Equilibria and the Revelation Principle
The traffic light examples hint at the existence of a special class of devices, in which the output space
is the action space and (in the context of communication devices) the input space is the type space.
Such devices are called canonical devices, since the input/output spaces are the canonical choices. If
we had chosen the traffic lights to emit three different coloured lights, which the drivers then had to
interpret, this would no longer be a canonical device. Formally:
Definition 3. A canonical correlation device is one in which Ω = A. A canonical communication
device is one in which S = T and M = A.
There are two advantages of dealing with such devices. On the technical front, the equilibrium condi-
5We assume no randomization is allowed, as the set S could be modified to incorporate mixing if desired.
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tions, which now become:
∑
t−i∈T−i
p(t−i|ti)
∑
a∈A
pi(a|t)ui(t, a) ≥
∑
t−i∈T−i
p(t−i|ti)
∑
a∈A
pi(a|si, t−i)ui(t, f(ai), a−i),
∀i ∈ N, ∀ti, si ∈ Ti,∀f : Ai → Ai
form a system of linear equations, whose solution is easily obtained.6 On the practical front, such a
representation makes more concrete the role of the device as a third party mediator, which issues direct
recommendations on actions, given information regarding players types. Diagrammatically, we have:
Non-canonical communication device: T σ−→ S pi−→M δ−→ A
Canonical communication device: T σ−→ T pi−→ A δ−→ A
Whilst the definition of strategies remain unchanged, the definition of equilibrium needs discussion.
One might be forgiven for assuming that a canonical communication equilibrium is any Nash equi-
librium of the game formed by attaching a canonical device to a Bayesian game ΓB. However,
[Forges, 1986], [Myerson, 1986] and subsequent authors include the extra requirement that, in a canon-
ical equilibrium, players must be honest and obedient, i.e. they report their true type to the device,
and take the action recommended to them by the device. Indeed, the inequalities stated above are for
such an equilibrium. Whilst it may seem unintuitive to allow for dishonesty and disobedience in equi-
librium, it is certainly feasible. Hence, we define a canonical equilibrium to be simply an equilibrium
with respect to a canonical device, and call a canonical equilibrium in which players are honest and
obedient an honest-and-obedient canonical equilibrium.
The Revelation Principle is a statement that applies to any equilibrium concept involving commu-
nication. Informally, it states that for any non-canonical equilibrium, there is a payoff-equivalent
honest-and-obedient canonical equilibrium. The construction involved in the proof is essentially the
same for correlated and communication equilibria; if one treats the device as a ’black box’, one can
simulate the actions players would have played in the non-canonical case, and enforce the canoni-
cal device to suggest these actions as its output. Clearly, there is no incentive to deviate from such
recommendations, since the original profile was also in equilibrium.
6This assumes that the action and type spaces are finite. We will maintain this assumption throughout this paper.
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2.3.1 Generalized and Subjective Correlated Equilibria
So far, we have dealt with devices that involve consistent beliefs, whether this be a common prior or a
uniform transition distribution, and partitional information. The relaxation of these restrictions was
examined in BDG in the case of correlation devices. Devices which use possibility correspondences,
rather than information functions are called generalized correlation devices, whilst devices that use
different priors on Ω are called subjective correlation devices.7 Amongst the results they prove are
that the set of generalized equilibria and the set of subjective equilibria are decision-theoretically
equivalent, where this concept is a stronger version of payoff equivalence that requires actions to be
equal on classes of information sets that are isomorphic to each other. This is an important result for
two reasons. First, it offers an implicit defense of the CPA, as it shows how allowing heterogenous priors
is tantamount to bounded rationality. Second, on the flip side, it shows that if bounded rationality is
to be taken seriously, or at least is of interest from a modeling perspective, then so too must subjective
priors. They also characterize the set of so-called generalized correlated equilibrium distributions, which
are essentially the canonical counterpart of equilibria generated using generalized correlation devices.
Thus, they prove a form of the Revelation Principle in the case of generalized correlated equilibria by
characterizing the set of canonical generalized correlated equilibria. We will discuss the extension of
this result to an analogously defined communication equilibrium.
It is easy to prove the Revelation Principle with respect to subjective correlated equilibrium:
Proposition 1. Let
(
d, α
)
be a subjective correlated equilibrium for the game Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N )
with respect to the subjective correlation device d = (Ω, (Pi)i∈N , (pi)i∈N ). Then there exists a payoff
equivalent canonical subjective correlated equilibrium in which players are obedient.
Proof. Set Ωˆ = A. Set qi(a) = pii
({ω¯ ∈ Ω|α(ω¯) = a}). Let Pˆi(a) = {b ∈ A|bi = ai}, where ai is the
ith component of the action profile a. Finally, let αˆi(a) = ai. Then dcan = (Ωˆ, (Pˆi)i∈N , (qi)i∈N ) is a
subjective canonical device, and
(
dcan, αˆ
)
is the desired subjective canonical correlated equilibrium.
2.4 Cheap Talk Games and Communication Equilibria
Whilst communication equilibria are the natural extension of correlated equilibria to games with in-
complete information, their original formulation was in the context of a set of stylized principal-agent
7They do not explicitly use the language of devices, but the definitions are equivalent.
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games, where an informed agent reports information regarding his type to a totally uninformed prin-
cipal, who then takes an action that determines the payoff for both.8 Such games have been termed
cheap-talk games, as the information transmitted by the agent has no direct effect on the payoff to either
player. The earliest examples of the analysis of such games are to be found in [Crawford, Sobel, 1982]
and [Green, Stokey, 1980].9 One can extend this scenario to allow for more general forms of commu-
nication, i.e. allowing both principal and agent to have private information, allowing both to have
information transmission roles and actions, etc.
The similarities to the communication device setup are clear, with one important distinction. With
communication devices, all information transmission is private; the device acts as a third-party medi-
ator for communication between players, and does not reveal its received inputs or generated outputs
publicly.10. Clearly, in the cheap-talk scenario, the device is totally removed from the system, and
the players communicate directly. As a result, it is to be expected that cheap talk equilibria may be
contained within private communication equilibria, but maybe not the converse. In other words:11
Definition 4. Let ΓB = (N, (Ti)i∈N , p, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be a Bayesian game. Then a cheap-talk
extension ext(G) of ΓB consists of T stages of costless, unmediated communication before G is
played, in which at each t ∈ T , each i simultaneously selects a message in M it and transmits it to a
subset of players. After the communication phase, players choose their actions. If the communication
is before players learn their types, then it is called an ex ante phase. If it occurs after they learn their
types but before their choose their actions, then it is called an interim phase.
Remark 1. The payoffs generated by all ext(G) is contained in the space of payoffs generated by all
communication equilibria.
For a formal discussion of this statement and its proof, see [Forges, 2009]. Of course, the duality
represented in Remark 1 depends entirely on the manner of communication allowed for. It is natural,
then, to assume that by generalizing the notion of a communication equilibria, we could find a suitably
generalized notion of cheap-talk that mirrors this duality. This is the aim of Chapter 5.2, which defines
a cheap-talk extension corresponding to our notion of a Bayesian communication equilibrium.
8See [Myerson, 1982], [Forges, 1985].
9The latter involves a more general setup than described, and will be discussed later.
10This idea was pursued in [Lehrer, 1996], which allows the device to issue public announcements.
11This definition is taken from [Forges, 2009].
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3 Extended Communication Equilibria
We are now ready to introduce the first of our generalizations of the concept of a communication device.
Combining the concepts outlined above, the most general form of a communication device presently
available follows the scheme:
T
σ−→ S pi−→M δ−→ A
We can extend this to cover the case where the device uses different transition probilities to generate
its output. Naturally, this may be termed a subjective communication device, following the scheme
T
σ−→ S pii−→M δ−→ A
In words, the device receives an input vector from the players and then uses different transition dis-
tributions to calculate private output vectors for each player. Such devices are open to attack by
proponents of the CPA as discussed. We aim to analyze such devices by ‘opening up’ the manner in
which the transition probabilities are calculated, and then demonstrating that such subjective devices
can be viewed as having bounded rationality in the form of non-partitional information. Let us begin
with a formal definition.
Definition 5. A subjective extended communication device (SECD) is a tuple
dc = ((Si)i∈N , (Mi)i∈N , (pii)i∈N , (Fi)i∈N ) ,
where Si is the set of inputs for i to the device, Mi is the set of private outputs from the device to
i, Fi is a partition of S for each i, and pii is the subjective transition distributions the device uses to
generate output vectors given input vectors. More precisely,
pi : Fi −→ ∆M
An extended communication device (ECD) is a subjective extended communication device where,
for fi ∈ Fi and fj ∈ Fj,
pii(fi) = pij(fj) when fi = fj
i.e. the distributions over M conditional on common information sets agree. A subjective extended
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communication equilibrium (SECE) of ΓB is a Nash equilibrium of the game formed by attaching
a SECD to ΓB.
Remark 2. Take a Bayesian game ΓB = (N, (Ti)i∈N , p, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ), and a SECD
de = ((Si)i∈N , (Mi)i∈N , (pii)i∈N , (Fi)i∈N ). Then playing the strategy profile (σ, δ) yields an expected
utility to player i of type ti of
∑
t∈T
p(t−i|ti)
∑
m∈M
∑
a∈A
pii(m|fi,σ(t))ui(δ(a|m,σ(t), t), σ, t)
This definition allows us to associate each s ∈ S with an element fi ∈ Fi. Let fi,s denote this element.
We say that the device ‘knows fi,s for channel i at s’.12
The device operates as follows. It receives an input vector from the players. However, whereas a
communication device has full certainty when reading this input vector, this new device does not,
reading it to within an uncertainty prescribed by the information encoded in the partitions Fi. The
device then generates an output conditional on this information.
Remark 3. If Fi = S, and if pii = pi for all i, then the SECD de = ((Si)i∈N , (Mi)i∈N , (pii)i∈N , (Fi)i∈N )
is a communication device.
Indeed, we can show that the notion of a SECD does not generalize that of a subjective communi-
cation device, thereby verifying that extended devices generalize communication devices only in their
operation, not in their equilibrium payoff sets.
Proposition 2. Every subjective communication device can be simulated by an SECD and vice versa.
Proof. Take a subjective communication device dc = (S,M,Qi). Set Fi = S for all i. Then fi,s = s
for all i ∈ N, s ∈ S, so set
pii(m|fi,s) = Qi(m|s), ∀m ∈M,∀i ∈ N
Then dE = (S,M,Fi, pii) is an equivalent SECD. Conversely, let dE = (S,M,Fi, pii) be a SECD. Let
Qi(m|s) = pii(m|fi,s), ∀m ∈M,∀s ∈ fi,s, i ∈ N
Then dc = (S,M,Qi) is an equivalent SCD.
12Henceforth, we call each of the i processing routes within the device ‘channels’.
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We give an example to demonstrate how such devices can generate equilibrium payoffs that pareto
dominate those achievable through communication devices.
Example. Consider ΓB = ({1, 2}, (Ti), (pi), (Ai), (ui)), the game of Bayesian Matching Pennies: T1 =
{s1, t1}, T2 = {t2}, p1(s1) = p1(t1) = 12 , A1 = {T,B}, A2 = {L,R}, and von-Neumann-Morgenstern
payoffs are given in the tables below:
s1 L R
T 1,-1 -1,1
B -1,1 1,-1
t1 L R
T -1,1 1,-1
B 1,-1 -1,1
Define the functions µ1, µ2 : T −→ ∆A as follows:13 If
µ =

µ1
(
(T, L)|s1
)
µ2
(
(T, L)|s1
)
µ1
(
(T,R)|s1
)
µ2
(
(T,R)|s1
)
µ1
(
(B,L)|s1
)
µ2
(
(B,L)|s1
)
µ1
(
(B,R)|s1
)
µ2
(
(B,R)|s1
)
µ1
(
(T, L)|t1
)
µ2
(
(T, L)|t1
)
µ1
(
(T,R)|t1
)
µ2
(
(T,R)|t1
)
µ1
(
(B,L)|t1
)
µ2
(
(B,L)|t1
)
µ1
(
(B,R)|t1
)
µ2
(
(B,R)|t1
)

Then let
13In the notation for µ, we assume T ∼= T1 by projection onto T1, i.e. we drop the need to include the label t2.
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µ =

1+
2 )
1−
2
0 0
1−
2
1+
2
0 0
1−
2
1+
2
0 0
1+
2
1−
2
0 0

Clearly, µ is a pair of transition distributions from T to A. Let Fi = T for all i. Then
dcc =
(
(Ti)i∈N , (Ai)i∈N , (µi)i∈N , (Fi)i∈N
)
is a SECD.14 Furthermore, if (αc, δc) is an honest-and-
obedient strategy profile, then
(
dcc, (σc, δc)
)
is a SECE of ΓB. In this equilibrium, each player receives
an expected utility of 2 . It is clear that any CE can yield an expected utility of at best 0. Hence, even
a small deviation in the device’s beliefs over the signal space can cause Pareto-improving outcomes in
equilibrium.15 For more details on this example, see Appendix A.
The causes of this payoff improvement are essentially identical to those outlined in [Aumann, 1967];
by using differing probability assessments, the device is effectively ‘betting against itself’, in the sense
that each channel holds a different prior probability assessment over the signal space. This clearly
could not happen if the device was not subjective, as a direct extension of Aumann’s famous common
knowledge result (see [Aumann, 1976]).
Within this framework, we can formulate a device that is analogous to the generalized correlated
equilibria in BDG.
Definition 6. A generalized extended communication device (GECD)is an ECD where for each
i Fi is a class of S such that:16 ⋃
i∈N
Fi = S
14It is also in canonical form, but this is irrelevant for the purposes of this example.
15Clearly, the SECE constructed tends to a canonical CE as → 0.
16A class of a set X is a collection of subsets of X.
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Clearly, this is an analogue of non-partitional information; the function
fi : S → Fi
fi(s) = fi,s
is the equivalent of a possibility correspondence as defined previously, whereas in the ECD case, fi
corresponds to an information function.
We are now ready to prove one of our central results, namely that every SECE has a decision-
theoretically equivalent GECE counterpart. In order to this, we must first formally define the notion
of decision-theoretic equivalence in this framework.
Definition 7. Let
de = ((Si)i∈N , (Mi)i∈N , (pii)i∈N , (Fi)i∈N )
and
dˆe =
(
(Sˆi)i∈N , (Mˆi)i∈N , (pˆii)i∈N , (Fˆi)i∈N
)
be two extended communication devices. Then the two extended communication equilibria
(
dc, (σ, δ)
)
and
(
dˆc, (σˆ, δˆ)
)
are decision-theoretically equivalent if their exist isomorphisms φi : Fi −→ Fˆi for
each i, such that
1. M = Mˆ
2. φi(fi,σ(t)) = fˆi,σˆ(t)
3. pii(Fi) = pˆii(φi(Fi))
4. For fˆi, . = φi(fi, . ),
∑
t−i∈T−i
p(t−i|ti)
∑
m∈M
∑
a∈A
pii(m|fi,(ri,σi(ti)))ui
(
νi(ai|mi, ti), (δ−i(a−i|m−i, t−i), σ(t), t)
)
=
∑
t−i∈T−i
p(t−i|ti)
∑
m∈M
∑
a∈A
pˆii(m|fˆi,(rˆi,σˆi(ti)))ui
(
νi(bi|mi, ti), (δ−i(a−i|m−i, t−i), σˆ(t), t)
)
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∀ri ∈ Si, ∀rˆi s.t. (rˆi, σˆ−i(t−i)) ∈ φi
(
(ri, σ−i(t−i))
) ∀bi ∈ Ai, ∀ν : Mi × Ti → ∆Ai,∀ti ∈ Ti
In short, this states that strategies align on isomorphic information sets, and that expected utilities are
equal. The isomorphism on information sets implies that the equilibria are behaviorally linked in the
sense that, faced with the two information structures, the players/device make the same decisions. The
first condition is necessary because players have fully certain on their respective outputs, i.e. on Mi.
Note that the last condition is stronger than payoff equivalence, since it also enforces that isomorphic
deviations from the equilibria yield equal expected utility. As noted in BDG, it is easily seen that
decision-theoretic equivalence is an equivalence relation:
Remark 4. Decision-theoretic equivalence is an equivalence relation on the set of SGECE.
(sketch of proof). Transitivity follows from the composition of isomorphisms being isomorphisms. Sym-
metry follows from the inverse of an isomorphism being an isomorphism. Reflexivity is clear.
We can now present the central results of this section. In each case, after outlining the statement and
proof, we discuss the intuition behind the proofs.
Theorem 1. Let de = ((Si)i∈N , (Mi)i∈N , (pii)i∈N , (Fi)i∈N ) be an SGECD, and
(
de, (σ, δ)
)
the associ-
ated equilibrium of a game ΓB. Then there exists a SECD dˆe =
(
(Sˆi)i∈N , (Mˆi)i∈N , (pˆii)i∈N , (Fˆi)i∈N
)
and strategies (σˆ, δˆ) such that the associated SECE of ΓB is decision-theoretically equivalent to(
de, (σ, δ)
)
.
Proof. Let Sˆi = Fτ(i), where τ : N → N is bijective and has no fixed point.17 Then Sˆ = Fτ(1) × ...×
Fτ(N).
Set
σˆ(t) =
(
fτ(1),σ(t), ..., fτ(N),σ(t)
)
For ease of notation, let Sˆ = F1× ...×FN . Construct partitions on Sˆ as follows: for (R1, ..., RN ) ∈ Sˆ,
let
Pˆi(R1, ..., RN ) = {Ri} × F−i
Essentially, the channel i’s is unable to distinguish between elements in Sˆ that have the same i-th
component. This induces the isomorphisms:
17For instance, let τ be the permutation (1 2 ... N) on the group with N elements.
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φi : Fi → Fˆi
φi(fi) = {fi} × F−i
Let the partitions Fˆi be generated by φi, i.e. let
fˆi,sˆ = φi(Pi(s))
Fˆi =
⋃
sˆ∈Sˆ
fˆi,sˆ
Now construct the distributions:
¯ˆpii(m|fˆi,sˆ) = pii(m|s), where fˆi,sˆ = φi(Pi(s))
Then dˆe =
(
(Sˆi)i∈N , (Mˆi)i∈N , (pˆii)i∈N , (Fˆi)i∈N
)
is the necessary device, and
(
dˆe, (αˆ, δ)
)
is decision-
theoretically equivalent to
(
de, (σ, δ)
)
.
To see that this is indeed an equilibrium, it is clear that there is no incentive for any player to deviate
from δ with respect to dˆB if there isn’t with respect to dB. To show that there is no incentive to
deviate from σˆ(t), suppose that τ(j) = i and τ(i) = k. Then
Fˆi(σˆ(t)) = Fˆi
(
..., fτ(i),σ(t), ..., fτ(j),σ(t)...
)
= Fˆi
(
..., sˆi, ..., fi,σ(t)...
)
= fˆi,(sˆi,σˆ−i(t−i)) ∀sˆi ∈ Sˆi,
i.e. player i reports in the set Fτ(i), hence any deviation by i will not change the ith component of
σˆ(t), since τ has no fixed point, and will thus be in the same information set with respect to Fˆi. Hence,
deviation at the input stage has no effect on each player’s expected utility.
We prove the converse to this result.
Theorem 2. Let de = ((Si)i∈N , (Mi)i∈N , (pii)i∈N , (Fi)i∈N ) be an SECD, and
(
de, (σ, δ)
)
the associated
equilibrium of a game ΓB. Then there exists a GECD dˆe =
(
(Sˆi)i∈N , (Mˆi)i∈N , (pˆii)i∈N , (Fˆi)i∈N
)
and
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strategies (σˆ, δˆ) such that the associated GBCE of ΓB is decision-theoretically equivalent to(
de, (σ, δ)
)
.
Proof. Let Sˆ = S × {1, . . . , N}. Let Sˆi¯ = Si × {1, . . . , N} for some fixed i¯ ∈ N , and let Sˆi = Si for
i 6= i¯. Construct σˆ(t) as
σˆ−i¯(t) = σ−i¯(t)
σˆi¯(t) =
(
σi¯(t), j
)
, for any j ∈ N
Construct partitions on Sˆ as follows: for (s, j) ∈ Sˆ, let
Pˆi(s, j) = Pi(s)
Then the isomorphisms φi naturally follow:
φi : Pi → Pˆi
φi(Ri) = Ri × {1, . . . , N}
Again, let the classes Fi be generated by φi. Then construct the prior distribution:
pˆi
(
m|(s, i)) = pii(m|s)
This distribution is well-defined because of the construction of the classes above, specifically, because
the classes are pairwise disjoint, i.e.:
Fi ∩ Fj = ∅, ∀i, j ∈ N
Then dˆe =
(
(Sˆi)i∈N , (Mˆi)i∈N , (pˆii)i∈N , (Fˆi)i∈N
)
is the necessary GECD, and
(
dˆe, (αˆ, δ)
)
is the decision-
theoretically equivalent equilibrium.
Again, it is clear that there is no incentive for any player to deviate from δ. To show that there is no
incentive to deviate from σˆ(t), it suffices to note that in the construction of Sˆ, the second component
is essentially a dummy, in that it has no effect on either the partitions Fˆi or the prior pˆi. Hence, player
i¯ can report any element of the set {1, . . . , N} without effect on the payoffs. Since the other strategies
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are identical to initial equilibrium, the no-deviation property is inherited.
In both the proofs above, the construction of the new signal space Sˆ is the key step. Both constructions
are taken from the proofs of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 in BDG. In Theorem 1, the construction is
essentially expanding the signal space to allow each channel to be able to ‘imagine what all others know’,
i.e. form the product space over all the classes of S, which represent the knowledge for each channel.
This may seem like cheating; by effectively endowing each channel with the combined knowledge
of all channels, it is easy to induce a partition on this construction, as has been shown. Indeed,
the construction offers an implicit argument against the existence of non-partitional information; by
extending the state-space sufficiently, one can ‘reveal’ a partition for a decision-maker, by allowing
him to perceive what he can perceive. A similar observation is made by [Luce, 1956] in the context
of preference theory.18 In Theorem 2, the construction is again natural in some sense. Essentially, by
adding the dummy space {1, . . . , N} to S, we are able to combine the given heterogenous priors into
a common prior by indexing using this dummy space.
These observations are not intended to undermine the results. They simply serve to give the reader
some insight into the choice of constructions, which, at first glance, may seem both arbitrary and
mathematically unappealing. Indeed, the objective of these results is simply to create a mapping
between the two sets of equilibria. The intuition behind the constructions is irrelevant with respect to
the intuition behind the results, which is self-explanatory.
3.1 Potential Drawbacks
Having introduced the concept of an ECD, we offer some potential shortcomings. Recall that the
original aim of constructing such a device was to simulate existing communication devices whilst
‘opening up’ the process through which they generate output. As such, it should preferably retain as
many properties of communication devices as possible, whilst explicating the ‘thinking’ process in as
efficient a manner as possible. There are two ways in which extended communication devices fail by
this measure.
First, the definition of the transition probability distributions is not strictly maintained by extended
18We thank Peter Hammond for pointing us toward this source.
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devices; in a communication device, we have
Qi : S −→ ∆M,
whereas in an extended device,
pii : Fi −→ ∆M,
Hence, the uncertainty embodied in the thinking process of an ECD is captured in the Fi, rather than
a direct thought process.
Second, and more importantly, extended devices do not perform Bayesian updating. In a sense,
Bayesian updating is the most natural form of information processing available, operating through the
following simple algorithm: prior understanding, observation, interpretation and subsequent under-
standing. Furthermore, it is the canonical model of information processing adopted within the game
theory literature. Hence, it would be desirable to model the device’s thinking process using Bayesian
updating.
4 Bayesian Communication Equilibria
In the last section, we introduced the notion of an ECD, and discussed various possible drawbacks of
such a device. We now attempt to address those drawbacks by constructing a new device, namely a
Bayesian communication device. This new class of device both preserves the structure of the transi-
tion probabilities and incorporates Bayesian updating. We will see how extended devices represent a
‘reduced-form’ version of Bayesian devices, in the sense that, whilst it does not restrict the equilibrium
payoff set, the device’s thought process is far more simplistic.
Definition 8. A Bayesian communication device (BCD) is a tuple
dB = ((Si)i∈N , (Mi)i∈N , pi, q, (Pi)i∈N ), where Si, Mi are as before, pi is a (common) prior distribution
on S, q is a transition probability distribution from S to M , i.e. q : S → ∆M , and Pi is an information
function on S.
A subjective Bayesian communication device (SBCD) is a Bayesian communication device in
which the prior pi and the transition distribution q is allowed to vary for each i, i.e. a tuple
dB = ((Si)i∈N , (Mi)i∈N , (pii)i∈N , (qi)i∈N , (Pi)i∈N ).
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A generalized Bayesian communication device (GBCD) is a Bayesian communication device in
which Pi is a possibility correspondence for each i.
A subjective generalized Bayesian communication equilibrium (SGBCE) of ΓB is a Nash
equilibrium of the game formed by attaching a subjective generalized Bayesian communication device
to ΓB.
Remark 5. Take a Bayesian game ΓB = (N, (Ti)i∈N , p, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ), and a SGBCD dB =
((Si)i∈N , (Mi)i∈N , (pii)i∈N , (qi)i∈N , (Pi)i∈N ). Given a strategy profile (σ, δ), the expected utility to player
i of type ti when playing the extended game ΓdB is
Ui((σ, δ), ti) =
∑
t−i∈T−i
p(t−i|ti)
∑
m∈M
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
p¯ii(s|Pi(σ(t)))qi(m|s)ui((δ(a|m, t), σ(t), t)
where p¯ii is channel i’s posterior, given by
p¯ii(s′|Pi(s)) =

pii(s
′)∑
sˆ∈Pi(s) pii(s
′) if s
′ ∈ Pi(s)
0 s′ /∈ Pi(s)
Alternatively, let Qi : S → ∆M be defined as
Qi(m|s) =
∑
s′∈S
p¯ii(s′|Pi(s))qi(m|s′)
Then
Ui((σ, δ), ti) =
∑
t−i∈T−i
p(t−i|ti)
∑
m∈M
∑
a∈A
Qi(m|σ(t))ui((δ(a|m, t), σ(t), t)
The device works as follows. Having received an input vector, it performs Bayesian updating on the
priors given the information encoded in the Pi’s. It then combines this posterior with the transition
distributions to generate an output. This is clearly a more natural extension of the communication
device, as it preserves the existence of transition distributions from S to M ; in Remark 5, these is
Qi (we will call these distributions the overall transition distributions). The only modification to the
standard communication device is in prescribing the manner in which the device explicitly interprets
its inputs. Diagrammatically, we have:
Communication device: T σ−→ S pi−→M δ−→ A
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Bayesian communication device: T σ−→ S update−−−−→
priors
S
q−→M δ−→ A
At first glance, it may seem as though, rather than dealing with the level of arbitrariness in the
transition distributions, Bayesian devices simply add a layer of thinking, whilst maintaining the same
arbitrariness in the distribution q. This is not the case. The process of Bayesian updating and the
manner in which these posteriors are combined with the transition distribution results in a probabilistic
weighting process; more weight is given to the distribution q(M |s) corresponding to a greater posterior
on s.
Remark 6. If Pi(s) = s for all s ∈ S, and if pii = pi and qi = q for all i, then the subjective Bayesian
communication device dc = ((Si)i∈N , (Mi)i∈N , (pii)i∈N , (Fi)i∈N ) is a communication device.
Moreover, we can show how extended devices are essentially Bayesian devices that operate using a
simplified thought process.
Proposition 3. For a given SGECD de = ((Si)i∈N , (Mi)i∈N , (pˆii)i∈N , (Fi)i∈N ), there exists a SGBCD
dB = ((Si)i∈N , (Mi)i∈N , (pii)i∈N , (qi)i∈N , (Pi)i∈N ) such that:
pˆii(m|fi,s) = Qi(m|s′), ∀s′ ∈ fi,s, ∀fi,s ∈ Fi, ∀i ∈ N.
and vice versa.
Proof. The converse direction is clear; set Fi = Pi, and
pˆii(m|fi,s) = Qi(m|s′), ∀s′ ∈ fi,s, ∀fi,s ∈ Fi, ∀i ∈ N.
as above.
Now Suppose M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mj} and S = {s1, s2, . . . , sk}. Then let the qi be the k × j right
Markov transition matrix for dB, i.e.
qTi =

qi(m1|s1) qi(m1|s2) · · · qi(m1|sk)
qi(m2|s1) qi(m2|s2) · · · qi(m2|sk)
...
...
. . .
...
qi(mj |s1) qi(mj |s2) · · · qi(mj |sk)

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Let pi i(s) be the k-vector of channel i’s posterior on S, given Pi(s), and let
Π¯i =
(
pi i(s1) pi i(s2) · · · pi i(sk)
)
Then, if
QTi =

Qi(m1|s1) Qi(m1|s2) · · · Qi(m1|sk)
Qi(m2|s1) Qi(m2|s2) · · · Qi(m2|sk)
...
...
. . .
...
Qi(mj |s1) Qi(mj |s2) · · · Qi(mj |sk)

we have by Remark 5 that
QTi = q
T
i Π¯i
Now let qi(m|s) = pii(m|fi,s), let Pi(s) = fi,s and let the prior pi be uniform over S. Then
(Π¯i′)ij =

1∣∣Pi′ (s)∣∣ if si ∈ Pi′(sj)
0 otherwise
Thus,
(
qTi′ Π¯i′
)
ij
=
∑
sk∈Pi′ (sj)
p¯ii′(sk|Pi′(sj))qi′(mi|sk)
=
∑
sk∈Pi′ (sj)
qi′(mi|sk)∣∣Pi′(sj)∣∣
= pii′(mi|fi,s), where sj ∈ fi,s
This shows that we can think of extended devices as ‘reduced-form’ examples of Bayesian devices. We
will see that such an analogy has heightened resonance in the context of the proofs of Theorems 3 and
4, which are essentially enriched versions of those of Theorems 1 and 2.
Like subjective/generalized extended communication devices, subjective/generalized Bayesian commu-
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nication devices can generate equilibrium payoffs that pareto-dominate communication devices:19
Example. Let ΓB = ({1, 2}, (Ti), (pi), (Ai), (ui)) be a Bayesian game: T1 = {t1, s1}, T2 = {t2, s2},
p1(s1) = p1(t1) = 12 , p2(s2) = p2(t2) =
1
2 , A1 = {T,B}, A2 = {L,R}, and von-Neumann-Morgenstern
payoffs are given in the tables below:
(t1, t2), (s1, s2) L R
T 0,8 3,3
B 1,1 0,0
(t1, s2), (s1, t2) L R
T 0,0 3,3
B 1,1 8,0
i.e., the first payoff structure obtains in states (t1, t2), (s1, s2), and the second obtains in states
(t1, s2), (s1, t2). We now define a device dB for ΓB. Let S = {(t1, t2), (s1, t2), (t1, s2), (s1, s2)} ≡
{1, 2, 3, 4}.
Let M = {m1,m2,m3,m4}. Define the (Pi)i∈I by the following:
P1(1) = {1, 2} P2(1) = {1, 3, 4}
P1(2) = {1, 2, 3} P2(2) = {2, 3, 4}
P1(3) = {1, 2, 3} P2(3) = {2, 3, 4}
P1(4) = {1, 2, 4} P2(4) = {4, 3}
Let pi(s) = 14 for all s ∈ S. Let q(mi|S) = 1i, where 1i is a vector of 0’s and a 1 in the i-th component.
Now define the strategy profiles as:
αi(ti) = ti ∀i ∈ N, ti ∈ Ti
δ1(m1, t1) = U, ∀m1 ∈M1, t1 ∈ T1
δ2(m2, t2) = R, ∀m2 ∈M2, t2 ∈ T2
Then (dB, (α, δ)) is a GBCE of ΓB. For further discussion, see Appendix A.
19This example is based on Example 2 in BDG.
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We now redefine decision-theoretic equivalence in this setting:
Definition 9. Let
dB = ((Si)i∈N , (Mi)i∈N , pi, q, (Pi)i∈N )
and
dˆB =
(
(Sˆi)i∈N , (Mˆi)i∈N , pˆi, qˆ, (Pˆi)i∈N
)
be two SGBCDs. Then the two SGBCE’s
(
dc, (σ, δ)
)
and
(
dˆc, (σˆ, δˆ)
)
are decision-theoretically
equivalent if their exist isomorphisms φi : Pi −→ Pˆi for each i, such that
1. M = Mˆ
2. φi(Pi(σ(t))) = Pˆi(σˆ(t))
3. For Pˆi( . ) = φi(Pi( . )),
∑
t−i∈T−i
p(t−i|ti)
∑
m∈M
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
p¯ii(s|Pi(ri, σ−i(t−i)))qi(m|s)ui
(
νi(ai|mi, ti), (δ−i(a−i|m−i, t−i), σ(t), t)
)
=
∑
t−i∈T−i
p(t−i|ti)
∑
m∈M
∑
sˆ∈Sˆ
∑
a∈A
¯ˆpii(sˆ|Pˆi(rˆi, σˆ−i(t−i)))qˆi(m|sˆ)ui
(
νi(bi|mi, ti), (δ−i(a−i|m−i, t−i), σˆ(t), t)
)
∀ri ∈ Si, ∀rˆi s.t. (rˆi, σˆ−i(t−i)) ∈ φi
(
(ri, σ−i(t−i))
) ∀bi ∈ Ai, ∀ν : Mi × Ti → ∆Ai, ∀ti ∈ Ti
We now prove the central result of this section. Again, the proof borrows elements from the proof of
Proposition 4.1 in BDG, but also makes some amendments.
Theorem 3. Let dB = ((Si)i∈N , (Mi)i∈N , (pii)i∈N , (qi)i∈N , (Pi)i∈N ) be an SGBCD, and
(
dB, (σ, δ)
)
the associated equilibrium of a game ΓB. Then there exists a SBCD
dˆB =
(
(Sˆi)i∈N , (Mˆi)i∈N , (pˆii)i∈N , (qˆi)i∈N , (Pˆi)i∈N
)
and strategies (σˆ, δˆ) such that the associated SBCE
of ΓB is decision-theoretically equivalent to
(
dB, (σ, δ)
)
.
Proof. Let Si = Pi(S), i.e. the partition of S generated by Pi. Let Sˆi = Sτ(i), where τ : N → N is
bijective and has no fixed point. Then Sˆ = Sτ(1) × ...× Sτ(N).
26
Set
σˆ(t) =
(Pτ(1)(σ(t)), ...,Pτ(N)(σ(t)))
Again, for ease of notation, let Sˆ = S1 × ... × SN . Construct the partitions on Sˆ as follows: for
(R1, ..., RN ) ∈ Sˆ, let
Pˆi(R1, ..., RN ) = {Ri} × S−i
Essentially, channel i is unable to distinguish between elements in Sˆ that have the same i-th component.
This induces the set of isomorphisms:
φi : Pi → Pˆi
φi(Ri) = {Ri} × S−i
Now construct the posteriors:
¯ˆpii(R1, ..., RN |{R¯i} × S−i) = pii({s ∈ S : Pj(s) = Rj , i 6= j |R¯i})
The left-hand side of this expression is the probability of the element (R1, ..., RN ) occurring, given that
the element (..., R¯i, ...) has occurred. It is essentially a projection/counting process; identify the signals
that lie in the intersection of the information sets R1, ..., RN , for some fixed R¯i and then calculate the
probability of this event occurring.
The input strategy profile σˆ(t) and the partitions Pˆi satisfy part 2 of the definition for decision-theoretic
equivalence. It remains to construct the transition distributions qˆi : Sˆ → M . For payoff equivalence
to hold, we require that
Condition 1. Qˆi(m|sˆ) = Qi(m|s) , where Pˆi(sˆ) ∈ φi(Pi(s))
In words, we require that the overall transition distributions are equal on isomorphic information sets.
Let
qˆi(m|sˆ) = Qi(m|s)∣∣Pˆi(sˆ)∣∣¯ˆpii(sˆ|Pˆi(sˆ)) , ∀m ∈M, sˆ ∈ Sˆ, where Pˆi(sˆ) ∈ φ(Pi(s))
Then
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Qˆi(m|sˆ) =
∑
s∈Sˆ
¯ˆpii(s|Pˆi(sˆ))qˆi(m|s)
=
∑
s∈Pˆi(sˆ)
¯ˆpii(s|Pˆi(sˆ))qˆi(m|s)
=
∑
s∈Pˆi(sˆ)
¯ˆpii(s|Pˆi(sˆ))
¯ˆpii(s|Pˆi(s))
Qi(m|s)∣∣Pˆi(sˆ)∣∣
= Qi(m|s)
The second equality of this derivation holds by definition of the posterior, the third holds by direct
substitution for qˆi(m|sˆ) and the fourth because ¯ˆpii(s|Pˆi(sˆ)) = ¯ˆpii(s|Pˆi(s)) for all s ∈ Pi(sˆ).20
Thus, the device dˆB =
(
(Sˆi)i∈N , (Mi)i∈N , (pii)i∈N , (qˆi)i∈N , (Pˆi)i∈N
)
is the necessary device, and the
equilibrium (dˆB, (σˆ, δ)) is the necessary equilibrium.
That this profile is an equilibrium follows an identical argument to that in the proof of Theorem 1.
We now prove the converse to the Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. Let dB = ((Si)i∈N , (Mi)i∈N , (pii)i∈N , (qi)i∈N , (Pi)i∈N ) be an SBCD, and
(
dB, (σ, δ)
)
the
associated equilibrium of a game ΓB. Then there exists a GBCD dˆB =
(
(Sˆi)i∈N , (Mˆi)i∈N , pˆi, qˆ, (Pˆi)i∈N
)
and strategies (σˆ, δˆ) such that the associated GBCE of ΓB is decision-theoretically equivalent to(
dB, (σ, δ)
)
.
Proof. Let Sˆ = S × {1, . . . , N}. Let Sˆi¯ = Si × {1, . . . , N} for some fixed i¯ ∈ N , and let Sˆi = Si for
i 6= i¯. Construct σˆ(t) as
σˆ−i¯(t) = σ−i¯(t)
σˆi¯(t) =
(
σi¯(t), j
)
, for any j ∈ N
Construct the partitions on Sˆ as follows: for (s, j) ∈ Sˆ, let
Pˆi(s, j) =
(Pi(s), i)
20It is important to note that this last step only holds because the Pˆi’s are partitions.
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Then the isomorphisms φi naturally follow:
φi : Pi → Pˆi
φi(Ri) = ({Ri}, i)
Now construct the prior distribution:
¯ˆpi(s, j) =
1
G
pii(s|Pi(s)),
where G =
∑
(s,j)∈Sˆ pii(s|Pi(s)) is the normalization constant. Let qˆ(m|(s, i)) = qi(m|s) for all i. Then
Condition 1 is satisfied, and the strategy profile (σˆ, δ) is an equilibrium of ΓB with respect to dˆB.
Again, that this profile is in equilibrium follows from the proof of Theorem 2.
For numerical examples of the constructions used in Theorems 1 and 2, see Appendices B and C
respectively. It is important to note that the GBCE constructed in the last proof does not satisfy
non-delusion.21 Figure 1 demonstrates this observation graphically.
21This result mirrors that following Proposition 4.2 in BDG, since the signal-space construction above largely mirrors
their construction of Ω˜.
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NND
SBCE OBCE
Figure 1: Chain of Inclusions generated by Theorems 3 and 4
NND refers to ‘non-non-delusion’, i.e. information structures that do not satisfy non-delusion.
Remark 7. Non-delusion does not expand the set of GBCEs of a Bayesian game ΓB.
Proof. Follows directly from Remark 4 and sequential application of Theorems 3 and 4.
Owing to the vast array of different devices, equilibria, associated payoff spaces and relationships
between these objects, it is worth summarizing the results obtained graphically. See Figure 2.
5 Further Topics
5.1 The Revelation Principle and Generalized Bayesian Devices
In section 2.3, we outlined the notions of canonical devices, equilibria and the Revelation Principle.
The system of linear inequalities defining a canonical equilibrium were shown to not only embody
a computational tractable problem, but also to provide a characterization of the space of transition
distributions that qualify as canonical, i.e. µ : T → ∆A is an honest-and-obedient canonical equilibrium
of ΓB if and only if
∑
t−i∈T−i
p(t−i|ti)
∑
a∈A
pi(a|t)ui(t, a) ≥
∑
t−i∈T−i
p(t−i|ti)
∑
a∈A
pi(a|si, t−i)ui(t, f(ai), a−i),
∀i ∈ N, ∀ti, si ∈ Ti,∀f : Ai → Ai
Essentially, the Revelation Principle comprises of two parts. First, it defines and classifies the set
of honest-and-obedient canonical equilibria. Second, it maps non-canonical equilibria into this set.
However, we have shown through examples how the set of equilibrium payoffs is expanded by allowing
for subjective priors. Since a canonical equilibrium generated through the Revelation Principle clearly
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Figure 2: Graphical Summary of Results
cannot contain payoff profiles outside the set of non-canonical equilibria payoff profiles, it is evident
that, if we are to assert the Revelation Principle in the context of either subjective or generalized
devices, we must re-define the set of honest-and-obedient canonical equilibria, i.e. we must relax the
constraints embodied in the linear equations above for a canonical device µ to qualify as a generalized
or subjective canonical device. The question is thus embodied in the following diagram:
CE′s RevPrinc−−−−−−→ CCE′sy y
SCE′s,GCE′s RevPrinc−−−−−−→ ?
First, let us consider subjective devices, be they extended, Bayesian or orthodox communication de-
vices. Just as was the case for correlated equilibria, it is easy to prove the Revelation Principle in this
setting.
Theorem 5. Let
(
de, (σ, δ)
)
be an SECE with respect to the device
de = ((Si)i∈N , (Mi)i∈N , (pii)i∈N , (Fi)i∈N ) for the game ΓB = (N, (Ti)i∈N , p, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ). Then
there is a canonical subjective communication equilibrium
(
dcc, (σc, δc)
)
for ΓB that is payoff equivalent
to
(
de, (σ, δ)
)
, in which every player truthfully reveals his type, and takes the action prescribed to them
by the device.
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Proof. If such a canonical equilibrium exists, it is by construction the case that σic and δ
i
c are the
identity maps on Ti and Mi respectively, for each i. It remains to construct a family of transition
distributions:
µi : T −→ A
such that
(
dcc, (σc, δc)
)
is a canonical communication equilibrium for ΓB that is payoff-equivalent to(
de, (σ, δ)
)
, i.e.
∑
t∈T
p(t−i|ti)
∑
m∈M
pii(m|fi,σ(t))ui((σ, δ), t) =
∑
t∈T
p(t−i|ti)
∑
a∈A
µi(a|t)ui((t, a), t)
Choose
µi(a|t) =
∑
(σ,δ)
∑
m∈δ−1(a)
(∏
i∈N
λi(σi, δi|ti)
)
pii(m|fi,σ(t))
where the distribution λi is the naturally induced marginal for each i and ti, and δ−1(a) = {m ∈M :
δ(a|m) > 0}.
The device constructed works as follows:
1. The device asks players to report their types.
2. The device simulates the reports (the σi(ti)s) that would have been sent according to the original
equilibrium, given the types reported in step 1.
3. The device determines both the distribution on M that would have been arrived at under the
original device, for each i, and the action profile players would have chosen under the original
device given this output.
4. The device prescribes this action.
It is now clear why the device-strategy profile combination created is an equilibrium; if there was any
incentive to deviate under the new equilibrium, there must have been in the original equilibrium, which
is absurd.
The statement and proof of the Revelation Principle for subjective Bayesian devices is identical in
nature, with the expressions for payoff equivalence duly altered.
Let us now consider generalized devices. To tackle this question, we draw analogy to Proposition
5.1 in BDG. This result characterizes the set of honest-and-obedient canonical generalized correlated
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equilibria of a normal-form game Γ, and hence verifies the first part of the Revelation Principle.22 We
now propose a classification of all honest-and-obedient canonical generalized Bayesian communication
equilibria.
Definition 10. Define
Qµ(ai, ti) =
{
q : T−i → ∆A−i | supp q(s−i) ⊂ supp µ(.|ai, (s−i, ti)) ∀s−i ∈ T−i,
∑
t∈T
p(t−i|ti)
∑
a−i∈A−i
q(a−i|t−i)ui((t, a), t) ≥
∑
t∈T
p(t−i|ti)
∑
a−i∈A−i
q(a−i|t−i)ui((t, bi, a−i))
}
Then Qµ(ai, ti) is the set of all transition distributions on A−i with support contained in µ(.|ai, ti) for
which ai and ti are optimal for i. For an arbitrary set Y , let
aff Y =
{∑
n
βnyn | yn ∈ Y,
∑
n
βn = 1
}
Conjecture 1. µ : T → ∆A is a canonical GBCE if and only if µ(.|ai, ti) ∈ aff Qµ(ai, ti)
Remark 8. The statement that µ(.|ai, ti) ∈ Qµ(ai, ti) is precisely that µ(.|ai, ti) is a canonical BCE.
The form of Conjecture 1 mirrors that of Proposition 5.1 in BDG, with the definition of Qµ(ai, ti)
extended to cover transition distributions, rather than simply probability distributions. Remark 8
shows that the conditions for a canonical GBCE are broader than for a canonical BCE, which is
logical. Proving it is beyond the scope of this project, as it would require extensive construction and
discussion in and of itself.
5.2 Fallible Talk and Bayesian Communication Equilibria
In Section 2.4, we discussed how direct communication between players can be formalized into a game-
theoretic solution concept, namely a cheap-talk extension of ΓB, and how the equilibrium payoffs
generated by such systems are contained in those that use private communication, examples of which
include the various notions of communication equilibria employed throughout this paper. We can now
construct a form of cheap talk that embodies the ‘public’ counterpart to BCDs. Consider the following
rules of an extension to ΓB:
22They refer to these equilibria as generalized correlated equilibrium distributions.
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1. Players learn their types.
2. Given these types, players send a message, or signal, to some subset of the remaining players.
3. Each player can interpret these messages up to some level of uncertainty, represented by a prior
and an information function on the signal space.
4. Having interpreted these signals, the original game is played.
It is clear how this scheme is closely related to that followed in a BCE.23 Such a scheme clearly has
practical application. One can think of a situation in which a person solicits the advice of an expert, but
cannot fully comprehend their advice, maybe for linguistic or technical reasons. Such communication
could be termed fallible talk. Note that this applies whether the players have partitional or non-
partitional information. More specifically,
Definition 11. Let ΓB be a Bayesian game. We define a fallible talk extension of ΓB as a game
in which many interim phases of unmediated communication is allowed before ΓB is played. More
precisely, let Si be a set of signals for player i, pii(.|si) be a prior measure on S for i, and Pi be an
information function on S for i. At each stage, every player selects an si ∈ Si. These choices are then
revealed to a subset of the remaining players. Having received the vector of inputs s−i, player i combines
this with si and interprets this new information by updating pii(.|si) using Pi in the following fashion:
suppose player i receives messages from players in J ⊂ N . Then he updates his prior conditional on
the event Ei, where
Ei = {(sJ , s−J), ∀s−J ∈ S−J}
At the end of the communication phase, the game is played.
Of course, such communication makes more sense in the canonical case, i.e. where each the signals
each player can send lie in their type space.
It is important to note that [Green, Stokey, 1980] also allow for subjective priors and non-partitional
information in their cheap talk games. However, they assume these properties for the underlying game,
rather than the additional communication phases, i.e. they allow the prior p on T to be different for
each player, and allow the agent to learn his type in a non-partitional fashion. With fallible talk, the
23One difference is that there is no message space involved in the scheme above, but this difference is purely cosmetic.
We could easily insert such an interim phase, but this would add no descriptive power to the specification of the process.
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underlying game involves full rationality and a common prior, whilst the communication phase may
not.
An interesting application of fallible talk is to the opinion game.24 To describe this game, we must
abandon the type space construction of a Bayesian game, and use a state-space/partition construction,
as discussed in Section 2.1.
Definition 12. The Opinion Game Let Ω ⊂ R, let p(Ω) be a prior distribution, let Pi be an
finite information function,25 let Ai = R, and let ui(a, ω) = −(ai − ω)2 (the players are rewarded
for approximating the true state ω with greater accuracy). Then ΓO = ({1, 2},Ω, pi,Pi, Ai, ui) is a
Bayesian game.
Now, consider a fallible talk extension of ΓO in which the signal space for each player is Ω, and the
priors and partitions are the same as for the underlying game. Then we have:
Remark 9. For the fallible talk extension of the opinion game described above, there exists an equi-
librium in which each player takes the same action.
This is simply a re-wording of Aumann’s famous common knowledge result; if two people share a
common prior, and their posteriors are common knowledge, then their posteriors are equal. Specifically,
it follows the form outlined in [Geanakoplos, Polemarchakis, 1982]; rather than common knowledge,
they assume a finite number of revisions of the players’ posteriors through direct communication. The
result holds even if we use possibility correspondences that satisfy non-delusion and balancedness. This
is essentially Theorem 6 in [Geanakoplos, 1989].
6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to extend the notion of a communication equilibrium to allow for explicit
modeling of the underlying device’s thinking process. We achieved this through the introduction of
two new devices, namely extended and Bayesian communication devices. We then showed how, in
both cases, allowing the device to adopt ‘multiple priors’ is equivalent to imposing bounded rationality
on it’s information processing capabilities. We discussed the Revelation Principle in the context of
extended and Bayesian equilibria, and concluded by discussing an analogue of cheap talk, namely
fallible talk in the context of Bayesian communication equilibria.
24As outlined in [Geanakoplos, 1989].
25i.e. |Pi(Ω)| <∞.
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The remit of this paper restricts the breadth and depth to which we can explore the concepts introduced
in it. As such, there remain many topics that are worth exploring.
For instance, it may be beneficial to consider refinements to the solution concepts involved. Nash
equilibrium is effectively the only solution concept used throughout; for all types of device, we look
at the Nash equilibria of the games formed by attaching the device. Indeed, parts of the proofs of
Theorems 1,2,3 and 4 would clearly not hold for more refined solution concepts.26 If we interpret the
game as being static, then ex-post and ex-ante equilibria agree, so Nash equilibrium is sufficient as a
solution concept. If, however, we interpret the extended game as being in extensive form, this solution
concept clearly runs into problems, as exemplified by such refinements as sub-game perfection and
sequential equilibrium a´la introduced in [Kreps, Wilson, 1982]. [Myerson, 1986] suggests an analogue
to sequential equilibrium for communication equilibria, namely sequential communication equilibrium.
The concepts discussed informally in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 could be formalized. It would be ideal
to prove Conjecture 1, and discuss it’s implications at length. Regarding fallible talk, it would be
beneficial to not only formalize the concept and results pertaining to it, but also to apply the concept
to existing examples, e.g. from the principal-agent literature. One could, for example, take the classic
quadratic-uniform game presented in [Crawford, Sobel, 1982], and apply fallible talk, so that principal
now receives the agent’s report, but has difficulty understanding it. This may well alter the structure
of the set of so-called ‘partition equilibria’ associated with the game.
We have been primarily interested in characterizing the set of equilibria generated by a class of commu-
nication devices, rather than fixing a device and examining the equilibria associated with it. It would
be interesting to consider the effects on welfare of marginal improvements in the device’s information
(the fineness of the partitions/classes), for any fixed SECE, GECE, SBCE, GBCE, etc. This type
of analysis was performed in [Green, Stokey, 1980], who find that, in their class of cheap talk games,
improvements in information do not necessarily generate welfare improvements.
Finally, it would be of interest to find direct, meaningful applications of the concepts involved, in
particular BCDs. This paper is largely theoretic, and the few examples contained in it have been
purposefully simplified. Possible applications include to stylized signaling games (see [Forges, 1990])
and market games a`la [Shapley, Shubik, 1969].
26For instance, the no-deviation reasoning used for σˆ in all cases.
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A Appendix A
First, consider the example from Section 3. The honest-and-obedient strategy profile is in equilibrium
if ∑
t−i∈T−i
p(t−i|ti)
∑
a∈A
pi(a|t)ui(t, a) ≥
∑
t−i∈T−i
p(t−i|ti)
∑
a∈A
pi(a|ri, t−i)ui(t, f(ai), a−i),
∀i ∈ N, ∀ti, ri ∈ Ti, ∀f : Ai → Ai
We verify the inequalities for player 1 of type s1. There are four cases, since |T1| = |A1| = 2. First,
note that 1’s expected utility in equilibrium is given by
U1((s1, a1|s1) = p(t2|s1)
(
µ1((T, L)|s1)u1(s1, (T, L)) + 0 + µ1((B,R)|s1)u1(s1, (B,R) + 0
)
=
1
2
(1 + 
2
· 1 + 1− 
2
· (−1)
)
=

2
1. r1 = s1, f(T ) = T
Then 1’s expected utility becomes
U1((s1, f(a1)|s1) = 12
(1 + 
2
· 1 + 1− 
2
· (−1)
)
=

2
Similarly,
2. r1 = t1, f(T ) = T
U1((t1, f(a1)|s1) = 12
(1 + 
2
· (−1) + 1− 
2
· 1
)
= − 
2
3. r1 = s1, f(T ) = B
U1((s1, f(a1)|s1) = 12
(1− 
2
· 1 + 1 + 
2
· (−1)
)
= − 
2
4. r1 = t1, f(T ) = B
U1((t1, f(a1)|s1) = 12
(1− 
2
· (−1) + 1 + 
2
· 1
)
=

2
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From these calculations, it is clear that the inequalities hold. Similar computations are possible for
the remaining types and players.
Next, consider the example from Section 4. Each player receives an expected utility of 3 in equilibrium.
Thus, there is no incentive for player 3 to deviate. The posterior matrices are given by
Π¯1 =

1
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 13
1
3 0
0 0 0 13

Π¯2 =

1
3 0 0 0
0 13
1
3 0
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
2

Since qi = I4, we have that Qi = Π¯i. Now, consider player 1. By lying, he received a payoff of at most
8
3 (by also deviating from T to B), which is less than 3. A symmetric argument holds for player 2.
B Appendix B
We construct numerical examples to illustrate the constructions used in Theorems 1. Throughout this
appendix, we adopt the matrix notation used in Proposition 3. Since the action-profile δ is invariant
under the transformation, we will omit this from the following discussion, i.e. we will assume payoffs
and a δ exist such that the remainder of the construction yields an equilibrium.
Now suppose we have a Bayesian game with two players, where T1 = {t1, s1}, T2 = {t2}, so T =
{(t1, t2), (s1, t2)} ≡ {t, s}, p1(s1) = p1(t1) = 12 , p2(s2) = p2(t2) = 12 , A1 = A1, A2 = A2, and payoffs
are simply ui(a, t).
Take the following device: S = T ≡ {1, 2} (i.e t = 1 and s = 2), M = {A,B}, the priors given by
pi1(1) = 12 pi2(1) =
1
3
pi1(2) = 12 pi2(2) =
2
3 ,
the possibility correspondences given by
P1(1) = {1, } := a P2(1) = {1, 2} := c
P1(2) = {1, 2, } := b P2(2) = {2} := d,
and the transition matrices given by
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qT1 =
12 23
1
2
1
3
 qT2 =
13 12
2
3
1
2

Then the posterior matrices are given by
Π¯=1
1 12
0 12
 Π¯2 =
13 0
2
3 1

so the overall transition matrices are given by
QT1 =
12 23
1
2
1
3

1 12
0 12

=
12 712
1
2
5
12

and
QT2 =
13 12
2
3
1
2

13 0
2
3 1

=
49 12
5
9
1
2

Now take the report profile α to consist of the identity map for each i, and assume that the combination
of this profile, with the above SGBCD, plus an arbitrary δ is in equilibrium. We proceed to construct
the decision-theoretically equivalent SBCE via the construction used in the proof of Theorem 1. Hence,
we have
Sˆ1 = {c, d}, Sˆ2 = {a, b},
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Note that there is only one τ that satisfies the necessary conditions, i.e. τ(1) = 2, τ(2) = 1. We
construct σˆ by
σˆ(t) =
(P2(σ(t)),P1(σ(t)))
=
(P2(1),P1(1))
= (c, a)
Similarly, σˆ(s) = (d, b). Again, for convenience, write
Sˆ = {a, b} × {c, d} = {(a, c), (a, d), (b, c), (b, d)}
Then the partitions Pˆi are given by
Pˆ1(a, c) = Pˆ1(a, d) = {(a, c), (a, d)} Pˆ1(b, c) = Pˆ1(b, d) = {(b, c), (b, d)}
Pˆ2(a, c) = Pˆ2(b, c) = {(a, c), (b, c)} Pˆ2(a, d) = Pˆ2(b, d) = {(a, d), (b, d)} ,
The posterior matrices are given by
¯ˆΠ1 =

1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 12
1
2
0 0 12
1
2

, ¯ˆΠ2 =

1
3 0
1
3 0
2
3 0
2
3 0
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1

For example, suppose (a, c) was reported. Then
pˆi1
(
(a, c) | {(a, c), (a, d)}
)
= pi1
(
s ∈ S, P2(s) = {1, 2} | {1}
)
= 1
pˆi1
(
(a, d) | {(a, c), (a, d)}
)
= pi1
(
s ∈ S, P2(s) = {2} | {1}
)
= 0
pˆi1
(
(b, c) | {(a, c), (a, d)}
)
= 0
pˆi1
(
(b, d) | {(a, c), (a, d)}
)
= 0
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Next, we calculate the qˆi’s as being
qˆT1 =
12 23 12 23
1
2
1
3
1
2
1
3
 qˆT2 =
13 12 13 12
2
3
1
2
2
3
1
2

Thus, the overall transition matrices are given by
QˆT1 =
12 23 12 23
1
2
1
3
1
2
1
3


1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 12
1
2
0 0 12
1
2

=
12 12 712 712
1
2
1
2
5
12
5
12

and
QˆT2 =
13 12 13 12
2
3
1
2
2
3
1
2


1
3 0
1
3 0
2
3 0
2
3 0
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1

=
49 12 49 12
5
9
1
2
5
9
1
2

By inspection, Condition 1 holds.
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C Appendix C
We now construct an example for Theorem 2. Take the same underlying game ΓB as in the previous.
For the SBCD, take S, M , pii, qi and σ also as previously, but for convenience, relabel S = {α, β}. Let
the partitions be given by
P1(α) = {α, β} P2(α) = {α}
P1(β) = {α, β} P2(β) = {β},
Combining the transition distributions with the posteriors yields
QT1 =
12 23
1
2
1
3

12 12
1
2
1
2

=
 712 712
5
12
5
12

and
QT2 =
13 12
2
3
1
2

1 0
0 1

=
13 12
2
3
1
2

We now construct the associated GBCD. Then
Sˆ = {α, β} × {1, 2} = {(α, 1), (α, 2), (β, 1), (β, 2)}
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Suppose iˆ = 2, then Sˆ1 = {t1, s1}, Sˆ2 = {t2} × {1, 2}. Define σˆ by
σˆ1(t) = σ1(t) = t1
σˆ2(t) =
(
σ2(t), 2
)
, say
Similarly for s. The Pˆi’s are given by:
Pˆ1(α, 1) = Pˆ1(α, 2) = Pˆ1(β, 1) = Pˆ1(β, 2) = {(α, 1), (β, 1)}
Pˆ2(α, 1) = Pˆ2(α, 2) = {(α, 2)} Pˆ2(β, 1) = Pˆ2(β, 2) = {(β, 2)} ,
The prior distribution pˆi is calculated by
pˆi(α, 1) =
1
G
pi1
(
α | P1(α)
)
=
1
3
× 1
2
=
1
6
pˆi(α, 2) =
1
3
pˆi(β, 1) =
1
6
pˆi(β, 2) =
1
3
Hence, the posterior matrices become:
¯ˆΠ1 =

1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
0 0 0 0
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
0 0 0 0

, ¯ˆΠ2 =

0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1

The transition matrix qˆ is given by
qˆT =
12 13 23 12
1
2
2
3
1
3
1
2

Hence the overall transitions become
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QˆT1 =
12 13 23 12
1
2
2
3
1
3
1
2


1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
0 0 0 0
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
0 0 0 0

=
 712 712 712 712
5
12
5
12
5
12
5
12

and
QˆT2 =
12 13 23 12
1
2
2
3
1
3
1
2


0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1

=
13 13 12 12
2
3
2
3
1
2
1
2

Condition 1 clearly holds by inspection.
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